Qualia 6 biography, Qualia 6 discography
Sony to showcase their best technology.Some Qualia products are brand new while others are upgraded and rebranded versions of regular Sony products.The line was launched in Japan in June 2003 and the U.This page was last modified 19:05, 17 November 2007.All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License."Redness" is the canonical quale.They can be defined as qualities or sensations, like redness or pain, as considered independently of their effects on behavior and from whatever physical circumstances give rise to them.In more philosophical terms, qualia are properties of sensory experiences.The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from the fact that they are often seen as posing a fundamental problem for physicalism.Arguments for the existence of qualia
2.The Explanatory Gap Argument
2.Scientific perspectives
5 Other Issues
5.But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one to another experience, they must be distinguished from the properties of objects.Frank Jackson (1982) later defined qualia as "...However, definitions this broad make it difficult to discuss the precise nature of qualia, and their interaction with the mind and the environment.Narrower definitions
Daniel Dennett identifies four properties that are commonly ascribed to qualia.In contrast, a "cooked feel" is that perception seen as existing in terms of its effects.Those who dispute the existence of qualia would therefore necessarily dispute the existence of philosophical zombies.There is an ancient Sufi parable about coffee that nicely expresses the concept: "He who tastes, knows; he who tastes not, knows not."Arguments for the existence of qualia
Since it is by definition difficult or impossible to convey qualia verbally, it is difficult to demonstrate them directly in an argument; a more tangential approach is needed.Perhaps it is not possible for a given brain state to produce anything other than a given quale in our universe, and that is all that matters.The idea that an inverted spectrum would be undetectable in practice is also open to criticism on more scientific grounds."Zombies", without any qualia at all.Joseph Levine's paper Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap takes up where the criticisms of conceivabilty arguments, such as the Inverted Spectrum argument and the Zombie argument, leave off.Of course a plausible explanation for there being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there is a genuine gap in nature.But so long as we have countervailing reasons for doubting the latter, we have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the former".Mary the colour scientist knows all the physical facts about colour, including every physical fact about the experience of colour in other people, from the behavior a particular colour is likely to elicit to the specific sequence of neurological firings that register that a colour has been seen.However, she has been confined from birth to a room that is black and white, and is only allowed to observe the outside world through a black and white monitor.This thought experiment has two purposes.That knowledge, Jackson argues, is knowledge of the quale that corresponds to the experience of seeing red, and it must thus be conceded that qualia are real properties, since there is a difference between a person who has access to a particular quale and one who does not.The second purpose of this argument is to refute the physicalist account of the mind.Specifically, the Knowledge Argument is an attack on the physicalist claim about the completeness of physical truths.The challenge the Knowledge Argument poses to physicalism runs as follows:
Before her release, Mary was in possession of all the physical information about colour experiences of other people.After her release, Mary learns something about the colour experiences of other people.Finally, Jackson argues that qualia are epiphenomenal: not causally efficacious with respect to the physical world.By redefining qualia as epiphenomenal, Jackson attempts to protect them from the demand of playing a causal role.In a series of thought experiments, which he calls "intuition pumps", he brings qualia into the world of neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological experimentation.His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is so imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the situation in question, or that the questions posed by the introduction of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special properties defined for qualia.Dennett argues, however, that it is impossible to know whether the diabolical neurosurgeons have indeed inverted your qualia (by tampering with your optic nerve, say), or have simply inverted your connection to memories of past qualia.Dennett attempts to show that we cannot satisfy (a) either through introspection or through observation, and that qualia's very definition undermines its chances of satisfying (b).He argues that Mary would not, in fact, learn something new if she stepped out of her black and white room to see the color red.If Mary really does know everything physical there is to know about the experience of colour, then this effectively grants her almost omniscient powers of knowledge.Using this, she will be able to deduce her own reaction, and figure out exactly what the experience of seeing red will feel like.In this way, without ever seeing a red tomato through her cameras, she will know exactly what it is like to see a red tomato.What if Mary was in a room without triangles and was prevented from seeing or making any triangles?Paul Churchland
Mary might be considered to be like a feral child.Feral children have suffered extreme isolation during childhood.Technically when Mary leaves the room, she would not have the ability to see or know what the color red is.Patterns need to form in the V4 section of the visual cortex.These patterns are formed from exposure to wave lengths of light.Lewis agrees that Mary cannot learn what red looks like through her monochrome physicalist studies.We have the intuition that Mary has been deprived of some vital data to do with the experience of redness.It is also uncontroversial that some things cannot be learned inside the room; for example, we do not expect Mary to learn how to ski within the room.Lewis has articulated that information and ability are potentially different things.Marvin Minsky
The veteran artificial intelligence researcher Marvin Minsky thinks the problems posed by qualia are essentially issues of complexity, or rather of mistaking complexity for simplicity.The big mistake comes from looking for some single, simple, 'essence' of hurting, rather than recognizing that this is the word we use for complex rearrangement of our disposition of resources".Indeed, a paraplegic can even have an erection and ejaculate without an orgasm.Without this component, again, you get just a reflex arc.Qualia and attention are closely linked.We cannot possibly be sure, when discussing individual qualia, that we are even discussing the same phenomena.On the other hand, qualia could be considered akin to Kantian phenomena since they are held to be seemings of appearances.In order to avoid epiphenomenalism, one who believes that qualia are nonphysical would need to embrace something like interactionist dualism; or perhaps emergentism, the claim that there are as yet unknown causal relations between the mental and physical.This in turn would imply that qualia can be detected by an external agency through their causal powers.Nagel, "What is it Like to Be a Bat?"It has been deemed "thoughtless and incoherent" (Taylor 1927, 198), "unintelligible" (Benecke 1901, 26), "quite impossible to believe" (Taylor 1963, 28) and "truly incredible" (McLaughlin 1994, 284)."Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson", Chapter 4 in A Neurocomputational Perspective, MIT Press, pp."Quining qualia", in Consciousness in Contemporary Science, edited by A."Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness", Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol."The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies", in Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds, MIT Press and Penguin.Body Problem Is Hard, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol."Supervenient Qualia", Philosophical Review, vol."Epiphenomenal Qualia", Philosophical Quarterly, vol."Identity and Necessity", in Identity and Individuation, edited by M.Mind and the World Order, New York: C.Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol.Rodolfo Llinas (2001) "I of ther Vortex" MIT Press.This page was last modified 21:52, 25 January 2008.Feelings and experiences vary widely.For example, I run my fingers
over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to
see bright purple, become extremely angry.In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that
there are qualia.The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely
because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of
consciousness.Representational Theories of Qualia
8.Which Creatures Undergo States with Qualia?Consider your visual experience as you stare at a bright turquoise
color patch in a paint store.What it is like to undergo
the experience is very different from what it is like for you to
experience a dull brown color patch.This difference is a difference
in what is often called "phenomenal character."The phenomenal
character of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo
the experience.If you are told to focus your attention upon the
phenomenal character of your experience, you will find that in doing
so you are aware of certain qualities.Viewers of
the painting can apprehend not only its content (i.Philosophers who deny that there
are qualia sometimes have in mind qualia, as the term is used in this
more restricted sense (or a similar one).One can agree that there are no qualia in
the last three senses I have explained, while still endorsing qualia
in the standard first sense.So, I
shall take it for granted that there are qualia.Which Mental States Possess Qualia?The following would certainly be included on my own list.Perceptual experiences, for example, experiences of the sort involved
in seeing green, hearing loud trumpets, tasting liquorice, smelling
the sea air, handling a piece of fur.Bodily sensations, for
example, feeling a twinge of pain, feeling an itch, feeling hungry,
having a stomach ache, feeling hot, feeling dizzy.Felt reactions or passions or emotions, for example,
feeling delight, lust, fear, love, feeling grief, jealousy,
regret.Felt moods, for example, feeling elated, depressed, calm,
bored, tense, miserable.Should we include any other mental states on the list?Galen
Strawson has claimed (1994) that there are such things as the
experience of understanding a sentence, the
experience of suddenly thinking of something, of suddenly
remembering something, and so on.On Strawson's view, then, some thoughts have qualia.These images frequently even
come complete with details of stress and intonation.As we read, it is
sometimes phenomenally as if we are speaking to ourselves.We may feel
tense, bored, excited, uneasy, angry.In any event, images and sensations of the above sorts are not
always present in thought.They are not essential to thought.These seem best treated as hybrid
or complex states, one component of which is essentially a phenomenal
state and the other (a judgment or belief) is not.Perhaps the most famous of these is the case of Mary, the
brilliant color scientist.Mary, so the story goes (Jackson 1982), is
imprisoned in a black and white room.Still, she wonders to herself: What do people in the outside world
experience when they see the various colors?She steps outside her room into a garden full of flowers."So, that is
what it is like to experience red," she exclaims, as she sees a red
rose."And that," she adds, looking down at the grass, "is what it is
like to experience green."Mary here seems to make some important discoveries.One possible explanation is that that there is a realm of
subjective, phenomenal qualities associated with color, qualities the
intrinsic nature of which Mary comes to discover upon her release, as
she herself undergoes the various new color experiences.This explanation is not available to the physicalist.What, then, can the physicalist say?Mary acquires certain abilities, specifically in the
case of red, the ability to recognize red things by sight alone, the
ability to imagine a red expanse, the ability to remember the
experience of red.She does not come to know any new
information, any new facts about color, any new qualities.But it has
difficulty in properly accounting for our knowledge of what it is like
to undergo experiences of determinate hues while we are undergoing
them.My conception of it is likely just that shade of red.An alternative
physicalist proposal is that Mary in her room lacks certain
phenomenal concepts, certain ways of thinking about or
mentally representing color experiences and colors.Once she leaves the
room, she acquires these new modes of thought as she experiences the
various colors.Even so, the qualities the new concepts pick out are
ones she knew in a different way in her room, for they are physical or
functional qualities like all others.One problem this approach faces is that it seems to imply that Mary
does not really make a new discovery when she says, "So, that is what
it is like to experience red."In this sense, what I
think, when I think that Cicero was an orator, is not what I think when
I think that Tully was an orator.The one thought exercises the concept
Cicero; the other the concept Tully.In an ordinary, everyday sense, Mary's knowledge
increases.And that, it may be contended, is all the physicalist needs
to answer the Knowledge Argument.Some philosophers insist that the difference between the old and the
new concepts in this case is such that there must be a difference in
the world between the properties these concepts stand for or denote
(Jackson 1993, Chalmers 1996).Some of these properties Mary knew in
her cell; others she becomes cognizant of only upon her release.There are proposals on offer (see, for example, Hill
1991, Loar 1990, Levine 2000, Sturgeon 2000, Perry 2001, Papineau
2002, Tye, 2003), but there is as yet no agreement as to the form such
a theory should take, and some philosophers contend that a proper
theory of phenomenal concepts shows that no satisfactory answer can be
given by the physicalist to the example of Mary's Room (Chalmers
1999).On this view,
physicalists who have appealed to phenomenal concepts to handle the
example of Mary's Room have been barking up the wrong tree (Tye
forthcoming).For me, as I lie on the beach,
happily drinking some wine and watching the waves, I undergo a variety
of visual, olfactory, and gustatory experiences.He has no phenomenal consciousness.He differs from me only
with respect to experience.For him, there is nothing it is like to
stare at the waves or to sip wine.Philosophical zombies pose a serious threat to any sort of
physicalist view of qualia.Intuitively S cannot occur without S.So, P has a modal
property S lacks, namely the property of possibly
occurring without S.Law (the law that for
anything x and for anything y, if x is
identical with y then x and y share
all the same properties), S is not identical with
P.Secondly, if a person microphysically identical with me, located in
an identical environment (both present and past), can lack any
phenomenal experiences, then facts pertaining to experience and
feeling, facts about qualia, are not necessarily fixed or determined by
the objective microphysical facts.And this the physicalist cannot
allow, even if she concedes that phenomenally conscious states are not
strictly identical with internal, objective, physical states.For the
physicalist, whatever her stripe, must at least believe that the
microphysical facts determine all the facts, that any world that was
exactly like ours in all microphysical respects (down to the
smallest detail, to the position of every single boson, for example)
would have to be like our world in all respects (having identical
mountains, lakes, glaciers, trees, rocks, sentient creatures, cities,
and so on).Loar 1990)
is to grant that they are conceptually possible, or at least that there
is no obvious contradiction in the idea of a zombie, while
denying that zombies are metaphysically possible.Inner states
that are physically very different may nonetheless feel the same.What
is crucial to what it is like is functional role, not underlying
hardware.There are two famous objections to functionalist theories of qualia:
the Inverted Spectrum and the Absent Qualia Hypothesis.And that representational difference brings with it a difference in our
patterns of causal interactions with external things (and thereby a
functional difference).Whether such cases are really metaphysically
possible is open to dispute, however.Certainly, those philosophers who
are representationalists about qualia (see Section 7) would deny their
possibility.For any two numerical inputs,
M and N, a given computer always produces as outputs
the product of M and N.There is a second computer
that does exactly the same thing.In this way, they are functionally
identical.Some philosophers will no doubt respond that it is still imaginable
that you and I are functionally identical in all relevant
respects yet phenomenally different.But this claim presents a problem
at least for those philosophers who oppose functionalism but who accept
physicalism.Some further convincing argument needs to be given that the two
cases are disanalogous.As yet, to my mind, no such argument has been
presented.However, these philosophers have other severe
problems of their own.Given the causal closure of the physical, how can
qualia make any difference?For more here, see Tye 1995, Chalmers
1996).The absent qualia hypothesis is the hypothesis that functional
duplicates of sentient creatures are possible, duplicates that entirely
lack qualia.The instructions are such that the participating
Chinese people function like individual neurons, and the radio links
like synapses, so that together the Chinese people duplicate the causal
organization of a human brain.The oddness of
this view derives, according to some functionalists (Lycan 1987), from
our relative size.But it does
not show that individual qualia are functional in nature.Thus one
could accept that absent qualia are impossible while also holding that
inverted spectra are possible (see, e.Our grasp of what it is like to undergo phenomenal states is supplied
to us by introspection.It is very hard to see how this
chasm in our understanding could ever be bridged.What it shows rather is that some physical qualities or states are
irreducibly subjective entities (Searle 1992).On this view, it may turn out that qualia are physical, but we
currently have no clear conception as to how they could be (Nagel
1974).Another view that has been gaining adherents of late is that there
is a real, unbridgeable gap, but it has no consequences for the nature
of consciousness and physicalist or functionalist theories thereof.There
aren't two sorts of natural phenomena: the irreducibly subjective and
the objective.These concepts mislead us into
thinking that the gap is deeper and more troublesome than it really
is.On one version of this view, phenomenal concepts are just indexical
concepts applied to phenomenal states via introspection (see Lycan
1996).This response to the explanatory gap obviously bears
affinities to the second physicalist response I sketched in Section 3
to the Knowledge Argument.Unfortunately, if the appeal to phenomenal
concepts by the physicalist is misguided (as I now think), then it
cannot be used to handle the gap.There is no general agreement on how the gap is generated and what
it shows.Recently, a number of philosophers have
claimed that introspection reveals no such qualities (Harman 1990,
Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, 2000).Suppose you are facing a white wall, on
which you see a bright red, round patch of paint.Suppose you are
attending closely to the color and shape of the patch as well as the
background.Now turn your attention from what you see out there in the
world before you to your visual experience.Focus upon your
awareness of the patch as opposed to the patch of which
you are aware.As you look at the patch, you are
aware of certain features out there in the world.In this way, your visual experience is
transparent or diaphanous.It's just that this time your experience is a
misrepresentation.The qualities of which we are aware are not qualities
of experiences at all, but rather qualities that, if they are
qualities of anything, are qualities of things in the world (as in the
case of perceptual experiences) or of regions of our bodies (as in the
case of bodily sensations).The point is that qualia are not qualities of
experiences.This claim, which will be developed further in the next
section, is controversial and some philosophers deny outright the
thesis of transparency with respect to qualia (see Block
1991).Still it does not follow from this that we are not
introspectively acquainted with such properties.If I feel a pain in a leg, I
need not even have a leg.Facts such as these have been taken to provide further support for the
contention that some sort of representational account is appropriate
for qualia.Moreover, just as the meaning of a word is not a quality the word
possesses, so the phenomenal character of an experience is not a
quality the experience possesses.Obviously there can be differences in the representational
contents of experiences without any phenomenal difference.One worry for this view is that if qualia are to be handled in terms
of representational content, then there had better be a content that
is shared by veridical visual experiences and their hallucinatory
counterparts.Disjunctivists have disputed the supposition that there
is a common content (see, e.Hinton 1973, Martin 1997, Snowdon
1990).Perhaps veridical experiences have only singular contents and
hallucinatory experiences have gappy contents or no content at
all.An alternative possibility is that qualia are properties represented
by experiences.On this view, there need be no common content shared
by veridical experiences and their hallucinatory counterparts.It
suffices that the same properties be represented.Of course, such a
view requires that a further account be provided of what it is that
makes a property represented by an experience a quale.On one
version of this view, visual experiences not only represent the
external world but also represent themselves (for a recent collection
of essays elaboarating this view, see Kriegel and Williford 2006).For
example, my current visual experience of a red object not only
represents the object as red (this is my focal awareness) but also
represents itself as red (this is normally a kind of peripheral
awareness I have of my experience).On this view, what a given experience represents is
metaphysically determined at least, in part, by factors in the
external environment.If these differences in content are of the right sort
then, according to the wide representationalist, microphysical twins
cannot fail to differ with respect to the phenomenal
character of their experiences.What makes for a difference in
representational content in microphysical duplicates is some external
difference, some connection between the subjects and items in their
respective environments.Qualia are not
intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which their subjects are
directly aware, qualities that are necessarily shared by internal
duplicates however different their environments may be.Representationalism, as I have presented it so far, is an identity
thesis with respect to qualia: qualia are supposedly one and the same
as certain representational contents.One class of these consists of cases in which, it is
claimed, experiences have the same representational content but
different phenomenal character.Christopher Peacocke adduces examples
of this sort in his 1983.Ned
Block's Inverted Earth example (1990) is of this type.The latter cases
only threaten strong representationalism, the former are intended to
refute representationalism in both its strong and weaker forms.That, it may seem, has no representational
content.Inverted Earth is an imaginary
planet, on which things have complementary colors to the colors of
their counterparts on Earth.The sky is yellow, grass is red, ripe
tomatoes are green, and so on.The inhabitants of Inverted Earth
undergo psychological attitudes and experiences with inverted
intentional contents relative to those of people on Earth.Indeed, in all respects
consistent with the alterations just described, Inverted Earth is as
much like Earth as possible.What it is like for you when you see the sky or
anything else is just what it was like on earth.But after enough time
has passed, after you have become sufficiently embedded in the language
and physical environment of Inverted Earth, your intentional contents
will come to match those of the other inhabitants.You will come to
believe that the sky is yellow, for example, just as they do.Similarly, you will come to have a visual experience that represents
the sky as yellow.So, the later you will come to be subject to inner states that
are intentionally inverted relative to the inner states of the earlier
you, while the phenomenal aspects of your experiences will remain
unchanged.It follows that strong representationalism of the
externalist sort is false.Perhaps the simplest reply that the strong representationalist can
make with respect to this objection is to deny that there really is any
change in normal tracking with respect to color, at least as far as
your experiences go.The sensory state that
nature designed in your species to track blue in the setting in which
your species evolved will continue to do just that even if through
time, on Inverted Earth, in that alien environment, it is usually
caused in you by looking at yellow things.However, it encounters
serious difficulties with respect to the Swampman case mentioned above.On a cladistic conception of species, Swampman is not human.Indeed,
lacking any evolutionary history, he belongs to no species at all.His
inner states play no teleological role.Nature did not design any of
them to do anything.Swampman has no experiences and no
qualia.This, for many philosophers, is very difficult to
believe.Which Creatures Undergo States with Qualia?Tropistic organisms, on this view, feel and experience
nothing.Consider, for example, the case of plants.There are many different
sorts of plant behavior.The
immediate cause of these activities is something internal to the
plants.Leaves are closed because of water
movement in the stems and petioles of the leaves, itself induced by
changes in the temperature and light.These inner events or states are
surely not phenomenal.It is genetically determined
and, therefore, not modifiable by learning.If, for example, flies start to
carry on their wings some substance that sickens Venus Fly Traps for
several days afterwards, this will not have any effect on the plant
behavior with respect to flies.Nor do they have
any desires.To be sure, we sometimes speak as if they do.What we mean is that
the daffodils need water.Reasoning of the above sort can be used to make a case that even
though qualia do not extend to plants and paramecia, qualia are very
widely distributed in nature (see Tye 1997, 2000)."Inverted Earth," Philosophical
Perspectives, 4, J."Qualia ain't in the Head," Nous."The Representational Character of Experience," The Future for Philosophy, B."Quining Qualia," in Mind and Cognition,
W.Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass:
The MIT Press, Bradford Books."The Intrinsic Quality of Experience," in
Philosophical Perspectives, 4, J.Color for Philosophers, Cambridge :
Hackett.Sensations : A Defense of Type Materialism,
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press."Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We may Know it so Well?""Armchair Metaphysics," in Philosophy of
Mind, ed.Representational Approaches to Consciousness Cambridge, Mass: the MIT Press, Bradford Books."Naming and Necessity," in Semantics of Natural
Language, ed.Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Conscious
Experience, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press."Phenomenal States," in Philosophical
Perspectives, 4, J.Northridge : Ridgeview
Publishing Company."Phenomenal States (Revised Version)" in The
Nature of Consciousness, ed.Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass : The MIT
Press."The Content of Perceptual Experience,"
Philosophical Quarterly."The Refutation of Idealism," in his
Philosophical Studies, London : Routledge and Kegan Paul."On the Persistence of Phenomenology," in
Conscious Experience, ed.The Significance of Consciousness,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press."Two Cheers for Representationalism,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research."Color and the Narrow Contents of Experience,"
Philosophical Topics.Chalmers, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.QUALIA VI: The Quantum Physics and Sociology of the Mature Human Individual versus the Immature Individual.And that is the further item of importance herein.Let's get
on with the subject.Hey, if that is the MATURE individual, then WHAT is the IMMATURE individual?IS THE TRUTH, is of INCORPOREALITY, and therefore COMES FROM the POSITIVITY of Infinite Consciousness (God).Okay, back to the MATURE Mind again.And here, or soon, I will be bringing into this discourse some terms that I have not too often dwelt upon, because they are the heart and substance of RELIGION, and as a scientist (Well, not really.MAY have some value, and relevance, IF they are used in SUBSTITUTION for TRUTH and KNOWING, when those two 'attributes' are missing from any situation (corporeal situation).FAITH, and my discussions elsewhere explain why, so I won't go into it here.With that admission, though, I am going to go on here and attempt to concentrate on the MATURE human Mind, as to What and Who IS the 'essence' thereof.POSITIVITY and TRUTH of the MATURE human Mind......BECAUSE, even IF there MIGHT BE some 'connection' TO ONENESS, the Reality IS that, inevitably, that 'connection', by NOT BEING OF, or IN, THE MOMENT, is CORRUPTED,
or in some way 'falsified', BY Lucifer's Negative influences (see The Book of Jerome: An Epistle on Human and Cosmological Existence and Reality!Sociological Existence and Reality and the Fundamental Negativity Therein As Created By the Human Mind.Getting back to MATURITY, let's examine the SOCIOLOGY of the MATURE human Mind further.PART of the WHOLE, of All That Is in the Cosmos!Negativity, between the upper and lower minds of the individual Local Mind!And, as explained elsewhere on these webpages (see QUALIA II: The Quantum Physics of Genetic Immaturity and Maturity in the Human Mind and other pages), the MATURE human Mind IS THAT Mind, that Consciousness, that has been 'created' BY BOTH one's 'Parents' AND by Infinite Consciousness (God)!Soul that one receives from those dimensions of God where it may have been awaiting this birth.But, we also need to look at this tentative, supposed, 'division' further, because BOTH upper and lower mind ARE COMPOSED OF POSITIVE quantum axion particles of Consciousness (nominally) and the very 'essence' OF quantum axion particles of Consciousness INCLUDES SPIRIT, the 'essence', or Sentience, of God, as one of the 'components' OF CONSCIOUSNESS!In other words, at the birth of the human individual, ONLY those genes are 'active' which bring into existence 'mind', BOTH upper and lower mind TOGETHER, AS the individual Local Mind, i.HOWEVER, IF societal 'conditions', of ALL OF HUMANITY (human civilization, of this world), are such that Lucifer's 'fingers of Negativity' DO NOT EXIST......Carl Jung has termed the 'Veil of Separation', or 'Veil of Unknowing', which (KNOWING, etc.ONLY through the individual's 'efforts' to KNOW oneSelf, i.Veil' BY 'Knowing' Who and What one 'Is', AS TO THE BASICS, the fundamentals, OF EXISTENCE and Reality, AND of one's PART THEREIN!However, there IS another way to 'activate' that gene pool of MATURITY of the human Mind!In other words, LUCIFER'S NEGATIVITY, and his 'fingers of Negativity', HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED, across the ENTIRE 'spectrum' OF HUMANITY!Well, WHAT does it take, for a human being to be 'born' with MATURITY of Mind, and for each and every individual 'self' TO KNOW their Soul?IF we would but let them BE!Well, I've already mentioned the first one earlier in this Monograph.It was AWARENESS, and with awareness comes KNOWING, of Who and What one IS, as to the BASICS, the FUNDAMENTALS, of Existence and Reality, AND of one's PART therein and thereof.Next, as to such human attributes NEEDED for MATURITY of Mind, we might say is TRUST!But, of course, I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT 'this world today', which is, of course, LUCIFER'S world, reigning, as he does, as "Prince of this World'!So, I am talking about POSSIBILITIES, which MIGHT COME INTO EXISTENCE, IF mankind SHOULD SO CREATE SUCH A POSSIBILITY!THAT EXIST IN THIS MOMENT (whenever such 'moment' may be!Of course, according to QUFD Principle, what 'comes into existence', IN THE MOMENT, in the 'Present', ARE THE 'selected' CORRELATES (quantum functions) of Past, Present and Future, REALIZED IN THE PRESENT MOMENT!ACCEPTANCE and RESPECT (for all individuals of humanity!Then, how about a few more 'attributes', like CARING (for one and all, for LIFE!CONSIDERATION, EMPATHY, GIVING, and on and on and on!I'm getting carried away here, and I just got the 'message' that I have forgotten to mention several of the MOST IMPORTANT 'attributes' OF ALL, which are absolutely necessary, in order to 'bring into existence', to 'create', IN THE MOMENT (a 'moment', incidentally, of A COMING TOGETHER OF ALL OF HUMANITY!You say IF humanity CAN GET its 'ACT TOGETHER', IN THE MOMENT (whatever 'moment' that might be!But, like I said, I left out a few of the most important 'attributes' necessary for doing so!And they are: WILL, or Will Power, the 'Power' of humanity TO 'WILL' something INTO EXISTENCE, BY......"And the next 'attribute' that I neglected to mention IS: COOPERATION!EVEN SPORTS AND THE OLYMPICS!THAT ARE COOPERATIVE
and emphasize 'sharing' and 'caring' and other such human 'attributes', rather than competition!MATURE human Mind is what exists IN ALL OF HUMANITY......GIVING to all of society, that which is exclusively one's reason and purpose (one's 'job', which can be done BY NO OTHER INDIVIDUAL BUT YOU!BEING, and likewise
RECEIVING back, in turn, from all of society, that which one NEEDS, in order to be enabled to GIVE that which one 'IS'!"Doing Unto Others, as You would Have Others Do Unto You!"All of this, of course, is done FREELY, with NO MONEY involved (money being one of Lucifer's Negativities!THEN, each piece of the puzzle, will FIT TOGETHER with each and every other 'piece' of humanity, AS THAT INDIVIDUAL 'piece' was so 'created' to do so, and that individual, AS WELL AS the whole of humanity, WILL BE FULFILLED, Whole and Complete, in the GIVING and RECEIVING therein and thereof one and all!ACTIVATE ALL OF THOSE human 'attributes' which I have just written about in this Monograph, THEN the Afghan People, AND THE WORLD, would be on our way towards 'creation' of a WORLD PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY!Well, at this time, I don't know if such will be, because, as I have also said, IT TAKES ALL OF HUMANITY, to change what IS (Lucifer, as 'Prince of this World'!Well, I don't think I will have much more to say about Immaturity, as I have quite adequately explained and detailed Maturity of the human Mind BY COMPARISON TO IMMATURITY, to 'what IS', already, in existence and Reality AT THE PRESENT TIME!If the Reader needs more examples and details OF such Immaturity, the Reader can review the other pertinent Monographs in this QUALIA Series, as well as my other writings on other webpages.I'm going to close this Monograph with one further comment that, indirectly, relates to both Maturity and Immaturity of the human mind.Such Negatives, of POWER, or the lack of Power, are what 'keep the lower classes in their place', and, in effect, contribute to the very structure, operation and functioning of society, AS A FEUDAL, yet modern, SOCIETY, of RICH versus POOR, Aristocratic NOBILITY versus the PEASANTS, ALL HIDDEN UNDER THE GUISE OF A MERITOCRACY, A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, IN WHICH, supposedly, THERE IS EQUALITY AND OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL, when, in fact, there IS NOT, but ONLY for the children, the next generation, OF THE RICH!SO, if that is the consequence of IMMATURITY, IS THERE A POSITIVE quantum 'correlate', or 'possibility', FOR A SOCIETY OF MATURE HUMAN MINDS?ALL OTHER Resources and societal 'means' OF ENABLING that which one GIVES), doing that which one was 'Born to Do'......THEN you have 'actualized' your PERSONAL POWER, and not only the POWER OF GOD is 'flowing through you', BUT ALSO the ENTIRE POWER OF THE COSMOS, because THAT is what YOU HAVE ACCESS TO, with MATURITY of the human Mind!Be careful, what one does with Personal Power, because it is UNLIMITED!But then, with MATURITY of Mind, such a 'warning' is quite unnecessary!So that is it, as far as I am concerned.Qualia is nestled neatly into the secluded northern most tip of Hamilton Island, an island of the Whitsundays surrounded by the unsurpassed beauty of the Great Barrier Reef.This is the "Qualia Effect".Built on an expansive 30 acres, Qualia's secluded, exclusive and private location entails 60 hillside pavilions, overlooking the Coral Sea.Each encompasses an expanded outdoor ara, living room, bedroom and stunning bathroom; with some incorporating private plunge pools.All offer uninterrupted views of the Whitsundays.It is the ideal sun worshipper accommodation.Each room features a stunning sun deck to make the most of the sun during the day and the sun sets across the island.Qualia provides the stage upon which Australia's exceptional produce and renown culinary talents are delivered.The Long Pavilion, Qualia's central facility encompasses its main restaurant, bar, library; and is surrounded by a still water pool running along its entire length.Private and beach dining are also offered.Spa Qualia, the exclusvie 6 room spa comprises four single treatment rooms and two couples' rooms, with Roman baths for utilimate indulgence.All prices are in New Zealand dollars and are subject to availability and currency fluctuations.The exclusive world class luxury Qualia Resort will open on the secluded northernmost point of Hamilton Island on the Great Barrier Reef in time for Hamilton Race Week in August this year.Qualia features a luxurious Beach House and 59 elegant and individual one bedroom Pavilions, some with private plunge pools and all with a private balcony offering magnificent views over Whitsunday passage.The Beach House is the ultimate experience in luxury prestigious private accommodation at Qualia.The beach house also has a separate guest pavilion for those traveling with friends and wanting to share this island experience.Surrounded by the beautiful Great Barrier Reef, Qualia puts a large number of pursuits at your doorstep.You may wish to enjoy all manner of water sports, diving, snorkelling fishing and reef tours.Special intimate dining options on the beach or in the Library or private dining rooms also will be offered.For guests wanting more variety, they may chose to dine at any of Hamilton Island's other restaurants including the exclusive Beach Club.Hamilton Island Resort provides unique culinary indulgences, the resort boasting ten cosmopolitan restaurants, seven bars, a night club and other eateries.FOUR Reasons to book your next holiday here...Submit a Travel Enquiry Form for a same day response.Events and Conferences can be arranged throughout Hamilton Island and surrounding bays.For assistance please contact our Groups Specialist.It is also the base for Australia's largest heli operation, Whitsunday Helicopters.Daily services by Virgin Blue and Jetstar operate from mainland Australian cities to airports at both Hamilton Island and Proserpine on the mainland.Qualia guests receive VIP transfers at Hamilton Island Airport.From Proserpine, a 30 mins coach or limousine trip connects at Shute Harbour with twice daily launch transfers to the island taking 60 mins.The Hamilton Island Relaxation Centre also offers a comprehensive range of treatments from professional massage therapists.This unique environment offers six individual treatment rooms and a dual treatment room.Qualia Resort is the heavenly place you will find it at.Hamilton Island Resort has a putting green and a golf driving range.While families are especially welcome on Hamilton Island, Qualia is an adult retreat providing for guests 18 years and older.Honeymoon packages are available on request.Hamilton's wedding chapel is situated above the resort overlooking the Whitsunday Passage and the resort provides a full range of related services.Don't leave home without it!For example, imagine
that the functional organization necessary for the conscious experience
involved in smelling a rose is instantiated through complex interactions
among the entire population of China.Suppose we convert the government
of China to functionalism, and we convince its officials to realize
a human mind for an hour.We provide each of the billion people
in China (I chose China because it has a billion inhabitants)
with specially designed two way radio that connects them in the
appropriate way to other persons and to the artificial body mentioned
in the previous example.We replace each of the little men with
a citizen of China plus his radio.Mental states only
arise under the constraints of natural law.Qualia 016 (2mpixel digital camera).QUALIA products will be available in the U.
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