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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
491 U.Consequently, her name was included in a "Police Reports" story in the paper, in violation of the Star's internal policy.The verdict was upheld on appeal.The sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights counsels the Court to rely on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case, rather than to accept invitations to hold broadly that truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment or that publication of a rape victim's name never enjoys constitutional protection.One such principle is that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order."Star to have received the information, and Florida has taken no steps to proscribe such receipt.The government has ample means to safeguard the information that are less drastic than punishing truthful publication.Furthermore, it is clear that the news article generally, as opposed to the specific identity contained in it, involved "a matter of public significance": the commission, and investigation, of a violent crime that had been reported to authorities.Imposing liability on the Star does not serve "a need to further a state interest of the highest order."Although the interests in protecting the privacy and safety of sexual assault victims and in encouraging them to report offenses without fear of exposure are highly significant, imposing liability on the Star in this case is too precipitous a means of advancing those interests.Florida is serving the interests specified by B.Court, in which Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ.JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.The issue presented here is whether this result comports with the First Amendment.The Florida Star is a weekly newspaper which serves the community of Jacksonville, Florida, and which has an average circulation of approximately 18,000 copies.Duval County, Florida, Sheriff's Department (Department) that she had been robbed and sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant.The Department prepared a report on the incident which identified B.The Department then placed the report in its pressroom.The Department does not restrict access either to the pressroom or to the reports made available therein.Thursday, October 20, she was crossing Brentwood Park, which is in the 500 block of Golfair Boulevard, enroute to her bus stop, when an unknown black man ran up behind the lady and placed a knife to her neck and told her not to yell.Patrol efforts have been suspended concerning this incident because of a lack of evidence."The Florida Star violated its internal policy of not publishing the names of sexual offense victims.Before trial, the Department settled with B.The trial judge rejected the motion.At the ensuing daylong trial, B.Department, and that the newspaper's violation of its internal rule against publishing the names of sexual offense victims was inadvertent.On both occasions, the trial judge denied these motions.This ruling left the jury to consider only the questions of causation and damages.The Supreme Court of Florida denied discretionary review.The Florida Star appealed to this Court.We noted probable jurisdiction, 488 U.Our decisions in cases involving government attempts to sanction the accurate dissemination of information as invasive of privacy, have not, however, exhaustively considered this conflict.On the contrary, although our decisions have without exception upheld the press' right to publish, we have emphasized each time that we were resolving this conflict only as it arose in a discrete factual context.Oklahoma County District Court, 430 U.The papers had learned about a shooting by monitoring a police band radio frequency and had obtained the name of the alleged juvenile assailant from witnesses, the police, and a local prosecutor.Appellant takes the position that this case is indistinguishable from Cox Broadcasting.In the alternative, appellee urges that Cox Broadcasting be overruled and replaced with a categorical rule that publication of the name of a rape victim never enjoys constitutional protection.We conclude that imposing damages on appellant for publishing B.Despite the strong resemblance this case bears to Cox Broadcasting, that case cannot fairly be read as controlling here.The name of the rape victim in that case was obtained from courthouse records that were open to public inspection, a fact which Justice White's opinion for the Court repeatedly noted.Significantly, one of the reasons we gave in Cox Broadcasting for invalidating the challenged damages award was the important role the press plays in subjecting trials to public scrutiny and thereby helping guarantee their fairness.Nor need we accept appellant's invitation to hold broadly that truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment.Indeed, in Cox Broadcasting, we pointedly refused to answer even the less sweeping question "whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability" for invading "an area of privacy" defined by the State.We continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.In our view, this case is appropriately analyzed with reference to such a limited First Amendment principle.To the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition, thereby bringing outside of the Daily Mail principle the publication of any information so acquired.To the extent sensitive information is in the government's custody, it has even greater power to forestall or mitigate the injury caused by its release.Daily Mail principle is the fact that punishing the press for its dissemination of information which is already publicly available is relatively unlikely to advance the interests in the service of which the State seeks to act.It is not, of course, always the case that information lawfully acquired by the press is known, or accessible, to others.The Daily Mail formulation reflects the fact that it is a limited set of cases indeed where, despite the accessibility of the public to certain information, a meaningful public interest is served by restricting its further release by other entities, like the press.As Daily Mail observed in its summary of Oklahoma Publishing, "once the truthful information was 'publicly revealed' or 'in the public domain' the court could not constitutionally restrain its dissemination."Cox Broadcasting, supra, at 496.Applied to the instant case, the Daily Mail principle clearly commands reversal.It is undisputed that the news article describing the assault on B.But the fact that state officials are not required to disclose such reports does not make it unlawful for a newspaper to receive them when furnished by the government.Appellee argues that a rule punishing publication furthers three closely related interests: the privacy of victims of sexual offenses; the physical safety of such victims, who may be targeted for retaliation if their names become known to their assailants; and the goal of encouraging victims of such crimes to report these offenses without fear of exposure.We accordingly do not rule out the possibility that, in a proper case, imposing civil sanctions for publication of the name of a rape victim might be so overwhelmingly necessary to advance these interests as to satisfy the Daily Mail standard.For three independent reasons, however, imposing liability for publication under the circumstances of this case is too precipitous a means of advancing these interests to convince us that there is a "need" within the meaning of the Daily Mail formulation for Florida to take this extreme step.As we have noted, where the government itself provides information to the media, it is most appropriate to assume that the government had, but failed to utilize, far more limited means of guarding against dissemination than the extreme step of punishing truthful speech.Department's failure to abide by this policy.Where, as here, the government has failed to police itself in disseminating information, it is clear under Cox Broadcasting, Oklahoma Publishing, and Landmark Communications that the imposition of damages against the press for its subsequent publication can hardly be said to be a narrowly tailored means of safeguarding anonymity.Daily Mail, supra, at 103.Had appellant merely reproduced the news release prepared and released by the Department, imposing civil damages would surely violate the First Amendment.The fact that appellant converted the police report into a news story by adding the linguistic connecting tissue necessary to transform the report's facts into full sentences cannot change this result.On the contrary, under the per se theory of negligence adopted by the courts below, liability follows automatically from publication.Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457 U.Florida is, in fact, serving, with this statute, the significant interests which appellee invokes in support of affirmance.When a State attempts the extraordinary measure of punishing truthful publication in the name of privacy, it must demonstrate its commitment to advancing this interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the smalltime disseminator as well as the media giant.Where important First Amendment interests are at stake, the mass scope of disclosure is not an acceptable surrogate for injury.Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.Without more careful and inclusive precautions against alternative forms of dissemination, we cannot conclude that Florida's selective ban on publication by the mass media satisfactorily accomplishes its stated purpose.The decision below is therefore
Reversed.In the present case, I would anticipate that the rape victim's discomfort at the dissemination of news of her misfortune among friends and acquaintances would be at least as great as her discomfort at its publication by the media to people to whom she is only a name.Yet the law in question does not prohibit the former in either oral or written form.In any case, the instructions here did not require the jury to find that the rapist was at large.For that reason, I agree that the judgment of the court below must be reversed.The Court reaches its conclusion based on an analysis of three of our precedents and a concern with three particular aspects of the judgment against appellant.Oklahoma County District Court, 430 U.Florida law forbids such disclosure.State makes no effort to safeguard in the first place.Cox Broadcasting inadequate to support its result, the Court relies on Smith v."The government's issuance of such a release, without qualification, can only convey to recipients that the government considered dissemination lawful," the Court suggests.So described, this case begins to look like the situation in Oklahoma Publishing, where a judge invited reporters into his courtroom, but then tried to prohibit them from reporting on the proceedings they observed.As the Star's own reporter conceded at trial, the crime incident report that inadvertently included B.See 2 Record 113, 115, 117.Thus, by her own admission the posting of the incident report did not convey to the Star's reporter the idea that "the government considered dissemination lawful"; the Court's suggestion to the contrary is inapt.By amending its public records statute to exempt rape victims names from disclosure, Fla.This case presents a far cry, then, from Cox Broadcasting or Oklahoma Publishing, where the State asked the news media not to publish information it had made generally available to the public: here, the State is not asking the media to do the State's job in the first instance.Second, the Court complains that appellant was judged here under too strict a liability standard.Court's concerns about damages resting on a strict liability or mere causation basis are irrelevant to the validity of the judgment for appellee.But even taking the Court's concerns in the abstract, they miss the mark.In any event, none of these mitigating factors was present here; whatever the force of these arguments generally, they do not justify the Court's ruling against B.But our cases which have struck down laws that limit or burden the press due to their underinclusiveness have involved situations where a legislature has singled out one segment of the news media or press for adverse treatment, see, e.Daily Mail (restricting newspapers and not radio or television), or singled out the press for adverse treatment when compared to other similarly situated enterprises, see, e.Simply put: Florida wanted to prevent the widespread distribution of rape victims' names, and therefore enacted a statute tailored almost as precisely as possible to achieving that end.Moreover, the Court's "underinclusiveness" analysis itself is "underinclusive."Thus, it is quite possible that the neighborhood gossip whom the Court so fears being left scot free to spread news of a rape victim's identity would be subjected to the same (or similar) liability regime under which appellant was taxed.Florida law is more comprehensive than the Court gives it credit for being.Consequently, neither the State's "dissemination" of B.Florida tort law requires setting aside the verdict for B.And as noted above, such a result is not compelled by our cases.By holding that only "a state interest of the highest order" permits the State to penalize the publication of truthful information, and by holding that protecting a rape victim's right to privacy is not among those state interests of the highest order, the Court accepts appellant's invitation, see Tr.Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.In our view it does not.Ironically, this Court, too, had occasion to consider this same balance just a few weeks ago, in United States Department of Justice v.Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 489 U.When the subject of such a rap sheet is a private citizen and when the information is in the Government's control as a compilation, rather than as a record of 'what the government is up to,' the privacy interest .More recently, in Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.First Amendment may prevent a State from ever subjecting the publication of truthtful but private information to civil liability.Today, we hit the bottom of the slippery slope.State's effort to protect a victim's privacy have failed.The statute provides in its entirety:
"Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense victim.In filing this lawsuit, appellee used her full name in the caption of the case .Respecting those interests, we, too, refer to appellee by her initials, both in the caption and in our discussion.Second District Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on First Amendment grounds of a rape victim's damages claim against a Florida television station which had broadcast portions of her testimony at her assailant's trial.The court reasoned that, as in Cox Broadcasting Corp.The State Supreme Court answered in the affirmative.State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.Garrison, supra (interest in public figure's reputation).We also recognized that privacy interests fade once information already appears on the public record, 420 U.The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.The second case in the "trilogy" which the Court cites is Oklahoma Publishing Co.Oklahoma County District Court, 430 U.As for the support Oklahoma Publishing allegedly provides for the Court's result here, the reasons that distinguish Cox Broadcasting and Daily Mail from this case are even more apt in the case of Oklahoma Publishing.Probably that is why the Court places so little weight on this middle leg of the three.The Court's concern for a free press is appropriate, but such concerns should be balanced against rival interests in a civilized and humane society.An absolutist view of the former leads to insensitivity as to the latter.Star's story was published, from a man threatening to rape B.Noting that the phone call was received at B.Another statute imposes civil liability on any person who "discloses" the content of tapped conversations.The Court's decision today suggests that this ruling by the Pennsylvania court was erroneous.In light of the substantial privacy interest in such communications, though, cf.The Court does not address the distinct constitutional questions raised by the award of punitive damages in this case.That award is more troublesome than the compensatory award discussed above.Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 Harv.Herbeck
Freedom of Speech in the United States, 5th ed.Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.On Sunday, March 14, 1999, R.Eventually, they went to sleep in M.In the early morning hours of March 15, 1999, M.Anthony began talking with them.During the course of the conversation with Anthony, M.Anthony making the obscene requests of J.Code 1975, and a Class A misdemeanor.Comment, Restatement, supra, at 73.In an attempt to show J.Anthony ("I need to know how long I will hurt, ...SOB to go straight to hell!"The second poem was written after J.Therefore, we affirm the trial court as to this issue.In BMW of North America v.Anthony, a married adult, gave J.In addition to testifying that she always slept with her bedroom door locked, M.Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Cite as: 1995 OK 111, 907 P.Putative father appealed from a motion for summary judgment in a paternity suit.Wanda and Jimmie were married on March 25, 1971.Jesse, was born on December 14, 1988.The couple were divorced on November 19, 1990.The divorce decree recognized Jimmie as the father of the child.Wishing to establish himself as the child's legal parent David claimed the child was the result of his adulterous affair with Wanda.Summary judgment was granted to Jimmie, concluding there was an irrebuttable presumption of paternity of the child as the child was born during marriage.Rex Earl Starr, Stilwell, for Defendant Wanda J.The issue, on summary judgment, is whether a putative father may pursue a paternity action over a child born within wedlock of another couple after more than two years of the date of birth has passed.Wanda and Jimmie were married on March 25, 1971.During the marriage three children were born.The youngest child, Jesse, was born on December 14, 1988.The divorce decree recognized Jimmie as the father of the three children, and ordered him to pay child support.The trial court granted summary judgment to Jimmie, concluding there was an irrebuttable presumption of Jimmie's paternity of the child under 10 O.The Court of Appeals held that the presumption of legitimacy established by Title 10 O.Furthermore, the Court of Appeals relied on decisions from Arizona, California, Kansas, Utah, and Washington to establish the putative father's standing to assert his own paternity.In the case at bar, Wanda and Jimmie were married on March 25, 1971.The youngest child, Jesse, was born on December 14, 1988.David filed an action to determine paternity of Jesse on May 20, 1992, three and one half years after Jesse's birth.We find that David is barred by Statute to contest the paternity of Jesse.The presumption of legitimacy can be disputed only by the husband or wife or the descendent of one or both of them.Illegitimacy in such a case may be proved like any other fact.Provided that if the child is born during the course of the marriage and is reared by the husband and wife as a member of their family without disputing the child's legitimacy for a period of at least two years, the presumption cannot be disputed by anyone.During the child's first two years of life the child was reared by the husband and wife as a member of their family and paternity was disputed by neither Jimmie nor Wanda.Hence, David is barred by the plain language of 10 O.David also claims that the statutory bar to his ability to assert paternity deprives him of due process.In that case, during the marriage of husband and wife, wife had an adulterous affair.Wife informed husband of the possibility of the child's parentage, but husband at all times held the child out to be his own.Husband was listed on the birth certificate as the father of the child.The presumption may be rebutted by the blood tests, but only if a motion for such tests is made, within two years from the date of the child's birth, either by the husband or, if the natural father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity, by the wife.By seeking visitation of the child the putative father was in essence wishing to be declared the child's father.The Court stated:
Of course the conclusive presumption not only expresses the State's substantive policy but also furthers it, excluding inquiries into the child's paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and privacy.The Court next addressed the putative father's substantive due process claim.The Oklahoma State Legislature has established a presumption covering the facts in the case at bar.David is barred by this Statute from rebutting the paternity of Jesse.The statute of limitations has run.David is expressly barred from instituting a paternity action.HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, OPALA, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ.Footnotes:
1 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has expressed the intent of an earlier version of this statute in In re Peacock's Will, 88 Okl.If neither the husband nor the wife to an existing marriage desires to raise any question of the legitimacy of a child born during its existence, the best interests and welfare of society will be promoted if the state likewise declines to intervene in raising that question .Ex parte Madalina, 174 Cal.See also, In re Tinker's Estate, 91 Okl.This Court in Frankovich v.The court shall further make provision for custody and visitation based upon the best interests of the child.Repealed by Laws 2006, HB 2967, c.Repealed by Laws 2006, HB 2967, c.
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